In this book William G. Lycan offers an epistemology of philosophy itself, a partial method for philosophical inquiry. The epistemology features three ultimate sources of justified philosophical belief. First, common sense, in a carefully restricted sense of the term-the sorts of contingentpropositions Moore defended against idealists and skeptics. Second, the deliverances of well confirmed science. Third and more fundamentally, intuitions about cases in a carefully specified sense of that term. The first half of On Evidence in Philosophy expounds a (...) version of Moore's method and applies it to each of several issues. This version is shown to resist all the standard objections to Moore; most of them do not even apply. It is argued, in Chapters 5 and 6, that philosophical method is far lesspowerful than most have taken it to be. In particular, deductive argument can accomplish very little, and hardly ever is an opposing position refuted except by common sense or by science. The final two chapters defend the evidential status of intuitions and the Goodmanian method of reflectiveequilibrium; it is argued that philosophy always and everywhere depends on them. The method is then set within a more general explanatory-coherentist epistemology, which is shown to resist standard forms of skepticism.In sum, William G. Lycan advocates a picture of philosophy as a very wide explanatory reflective equilibrium incorporating common sense, science, and our firmest intuitions on any topic-and nothing more, not ever. (shrink)

Toward theory a homuncular of believing For years and years, philosophers took thoughts and beliefs to be modifications of incorporeal Cartesian egos. ...

William G. Lycan; XII*—Two—No, Three—Concepts of Possible Worlds, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 215–228, https.

Has any school or movement in all of Western philosophy made a permanent contribution, permanent in the sense that it will last as long as philosophy does? More narrowly, has there ever been put forward a thesis that has achieved lasting consensus? After carefully defining “philosophical thesis” and “consensus,” so as to forestall uninteresting answers, this paper argues that the ancient Greeks made one or two such contributions, and the Analytic philosophers (ca. 1890–1960) made a few, but there have been (...) no others. Moreover (a) the Analytic contributions were more empirical than philosophical, and (b) they were almost entirely negative. So, the basic short answer to our question is “no.” The paper concludes by asking in what way(s) there has been progress in philosophy. (shrink)

On Evidence in Philosophy sketches an epistemology of philosophy itself, a method for philosophical inquiry. Part 1 defends a version of Moore's method of “common sense,” in which humble, boring everyday facts like “I have hands” and “I had breakfast earlier today” trump the a priori philosophical premises of arguments for various eliminative idealisms and skepticisms. Part 2 exhibits the deeper poverty of philosophical method, arguing that philosophy cannot prove or even refute any interesting thesis. But Part 3 defends intuitions (...) as giving us good prima facie reason to accept the judgments they support, and then develops the method of wide reflective equilibrium in the context of a broader explanatory-coherentist epistemology. (shrink)

Since Twin Earth was discovered by American philosophical-space explorers in the 1970s, the domain of.

Though Noë is concerned to emphasize that perceptual experiences are not per se internal representations, he does not really say why, and he is fairly quiet about what he takes intentionality and representation themselves to be. Drawing on a subsequent paper (Noë (forthcoming)), I bring out and criticize his in fact radically negative view of those fundamental mental capacities.

‘[I]ntrospection’ is just a convenient word to describe our way of knowing what is going on in our own mind, and anyone convinced that we know—at least sometimes—what is going on in our own mind and therefore, that we have a mind and, therefore, that we are not zombies, must believe that introspection is the answer we are looking for. I, too, believe in introspection.

Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the ..

Locke put forward the theory of consciousness as "internal Sense" or "reflection"; Kant made it inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state." On that theory, consciousness is a perception-like second-order representing of our own psychological states events. The term "consciousness," of course, has many distinct uses.

This book contends that insufficient attention has been paid to the syntax of conditionals, as investigated by linguists.

Now in its Third Edition, Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction introduces students to the main issues and theories in twentieth-century philosophy of language, focusing specifically on linguistic phenomena. Author William G. Lycan structures the book into four general parts. Part I, Reference and Referring, includes topics such as Russell's theory of descriptions (and its objections), Donnellan's distinction, problems of anaphora, the description theory of proper names, Searle's cluster theory, and the causal-historical theory. Part II, Theories of Meaning, surveys (...) the competing theories of linguistic meaning and compares their various advantages and liabilities. Part III, Pragmatics and Speech Acts, introduces the basic concepts of linguistic pragmatics and includes a detailed discussion of the problem of indirect force. Part IV, The Expressive and the Figurative, examines various forms of expressive language and what "metaphorical meaning" is and how most listeners readily grasp it. (shrink)

In the nearly half a century since its modern inception (Anscombe (1965), Hintikka (1969)), the Representation theory has faced no more implacable enemy than Ned Block. He has offered objection after objection, usually in the form of apparent counterexamples, and as I write this he shows no sign of flagging.

First published in 1990, Mind and Cognition: An Anthology is now firmly established as a popular teaching apparatus for upper level undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of mind. Brings together the most important classic and contemporary articles in philosophy of mind and cognition Completely revised and updated throughout, in response to feedback from teachers in the field Now includes 20 new readings Each updated part opens with a brief, synoptic introduction to the individual field and a comprehensive further (...) reading list Each section also includes three to four of the most influential papers that have been written in the philosophy of mind over the last 40 years. (shrink)

In this book, William Lycan reviews the diverse philosophical views on consciousness--including those of Kripke, Block, Campbell, Sellars, and Casteneda--and ..

MEANING POSTULATES REINSTATED If I am right in agreeing with Cresswell that the "logicarrlexicaT distinction is one of degree rather than one of kind, that in turn impugns the distinction between the official truth-rules that define logical ...

This book reveals a stunning thread of scientific data that points the way to the natural anabolic state a biochemical condition wherein body fat is metabolized, muscle tissue is built, strength and speed are increased, mental acuity is enhanced, and the mind and body perform at top efficiency. This inspirational book is a must-read for athletes and coaches in every sport, students and teachers at every level, people of faith, people seeking faith, and anyone competing for success. Readers will learn (...) how one simple thought altered the blood chemistry of students taking the GRE and raised test scores and how that same thought increased athletic performance in multiple sports. Readers will also come to understand why honesty, gratitude, humility, self-discipline, assertiveness, love, faith, and playing-to-win induce an empowering anabolic blood chemistry. If you read this book, you will meet Jenny (the girl who achieved a seemingly impossible goal), Susie (the most aggressive infielder I ve ever seen), Hank (the shortstop who experienced his worst nightmare), John Doe (the guy who experienced all five types of stress before leaving his driveway), Attila the Hun (an example of humility), and several more unforgettable characters. If you read this book, I promise you that, by the time you finish the third chapter, you will fervently wish you'd read it earlier in your life. (shrink)

What does vision represent? What does hearing represent? Smell? Touch? Competing answers to each of these questions have been defended. The present paper argues that the issue of what taste represents is categorically more complicated. In particular, it raises two very difficult dilemmas.

This paper addresses each of two of Gutting's three main contentions: that like anyone else, philosophers are entitled to begin with what they find obvious and that philosophy has produced a distinctive body of knowledge. I emphatically agree with the first contention and expand on it, defending a stronger claim. The second contention I dispute, in spirit if not in letter, on each of several grounds.

As a clinical geneticist I have been amazed at the speed of discovery over the past 20 years. The specific genetic causes of thousands of rare genetic conditions have been defined due to improvements in genomic sequencing, computing power and international collaborations to phenotype individuals with similar clinical features. This knowledge has resulted in an increased ability to make accurate molecular diagnoses which informs optimal treatment and clinical care, can remove the need for unnecessary investigations and informs reproductive decision-making. However (...) for any given individual, this genetic testing can often take weeks or months before the initial genetic diagnosis is made within a family. Occasionally genetic information is required more quickly to define a clinical action. For years point of care testing (POCT) has been a mainstay of clinical care, for example, in confirming pregnancy or monitoring blood glucose. I had been keen to explore scenarios where a genetic POCT could be employed in clinical practice. To me, an obvious example appeared to be neonatal testing to avoid gentamicin-induced hearing loss. Here was a situation where we had known about the genetic …. (shrink)